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CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORT LITIGATION:
"WHICH WAY DO WE GO, JUDGE?"
Many can remember the Looney Toons character, Dumb Dog,
who was often portrayed looking quite confused after the crafty
Bugs Bunny pulled one of his famous disappearing acts. "Which
way did he go? Which way did he go? Which way did he go,
George?" Similarly, the toxic tort plaintiff, when confronted with
the nearly impossible burden of establishing causation, may experi-
ence feelings of anxiety, frustration and desperation wondering
how is he ever going to prove his case.' One can visualize plaintiff's
counsel, like the cartoon character, standing in front of the judge
after his last expert has been excluded on Daubert grounds asking,
"Which way do we go, Judge?" 2
The toxic tort is a new species of tort action and is an out-
growth of our industrialized society.3 Toxic tort cases, frequently
1. For a discussion of causation in toxic tort litigation, see infra notes 6, 11, 26-
35 and accompanying text and note 78.
2. For a complete discussion of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), see infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
3. See Christopher H. BuckleyJr. & Charley H. Haake, Separating the Scientist's
Wheat from the Charlatan's Chaff: Daubert's Role in Toxic Tort Litigation, 28 ENvmL. L.
R-P. 10293 (June 1998) (discussing components of toxic tort cases); see also Robert
F. Blomquist, Witches' Brew: Some Synoptical Reflections on the Supreme Court's Danger-
ous Substance Discourse, 1790-1998, 43 ST. Louis L.J. 297, 302 (discussing increasing
awareness of harmful substances). Blomquist states:
Knowledge about harmful substances exploded during the twentieth cen-
tury, particularly in the years following World War II. A sample of some
significant developments include the following: the public studies of
Louis Lewin, a German toxicologist, during the 1920s, on the chronic
toxicity if narcotics and other alkaloids; the work of E.M. Geilling in the
Pharmacology Department of the University of Chicago, during the
1920s, which explained the mechanism of toxicity for sulfanilamide and
ethylene (chemicals which had earlier been used in medications for treat-
ing various bacterial diseases but were tragically responsible for several
deaths from acute kidney failure); the discovery of DDT and phenoxy
herbicides during the 1940s which, originally, were used as agricultural
poisons, or pesticides; the discovery of organophosphate cholinesterase
inhibitors by W. Lange and G. Schrader during the 1940s which sparked
further important developments in neurophysiology and toxicology for
years to come; the first publication during the late 1950s of the seminal
journal Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology; the horrific discovery that
the drug Thalidomide caused grotesque deformities of children born of
women who took the drug while pregnant; the discovery of a "high-affin-
ity cellular binding protein designated the 'Ah' receptor" and work on
the genetics of this protein during the 1980s; and the growth, during the
1990s, of over 120journals devoted to toxicology, risk assessment and risk
management, and related fields.
(33)
1
Alberts: Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: Which Way Do We Go, Judge
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
34 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
arising in an environmental law context, involve personal injury
and related harms resulting from exposure to toxic substances.4
The plaintiffs injury is often a syndrome or a terminal disease.5
"Because such injuries are not immediately apparent, because
symptoms may not be unique to the disease, because the diseases
remain latent for a long time, and because there is great opportu-
nity for other sources of injury to arise, proving causation of a toxic
tort is a challenging prospect."6
Commentators note that no "issue has been, or continues to
be, more hotly debated in the courts than the appropriate means of
dealing with scientific evidence" in toxic tort cases. 7 The existence
of these unique causation problems that confront plaintiffs in toxic
Id.
4. See Patricia E. Lin, Opening the Gates to Scientific Evidence in Toxic Exposure
Cases: Medical Monitorng and Daubert, 17 REv. LITIG. 551, 552 (Summer 1998) (dis-
cussing nature of toxic tort cases).
5. See id. (describing common injuries in toxic torts).
6. Id. Long latency periods after exposure and the fact that the same illnesses
occur naturally make it difficult to establish a prima facia tort claim. Id. Lin notes:
Over time, memories fade, witnesses disappear, records are destroyed,
and opportunities abound for other causative events to occur. Even af-
flictions with short latency periods can cause problems for parties seeking
to establish causation. Scientific certainty that exposure to certain sub-
stances causes given diseases is often unavailable. Each person's physical
idiosyncrasies, genetic make-up, and medical history make the determina-
tion of individual causation close to impossible.
Id. See generally M. Neil Browne, TerriJ. Keeley & WesleyJ. Heirs, The Epistemologi-
cal Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic Torts, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (Fall 1998) (stating that
causation can not be established to certainty).
7. See generally Paul S. Miller & Bert W. Rein, WitherDaubert? Relaible Resolution
of Scientfically-Based Causality Issues in Toxic Tort Cases, 50 RUTGERS L.J. 563 (Winter
1998). Daubert did not provide an abundance of guidance and the extent to which
expert testimony must comply with admissibility standards in trials continues to
present unsettled issues that are presently causing havoc in the expert evidence
world. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (holding that Court has not set out definitive
check list). Since June of 1998, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in two cases in order to review issues associated with the admissibility standards
governing expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
Daubert. See e.g., Weisgram v. Marley Co., et al., 1999 WL 552788 (U.S. Sept. 28,
1999)(granting certiorari). The issue remanded for appeal in Weisgram is
"[w] hether it is appropriate for an appeals court to order judgement as a matter of
law after determining that a plaintiffs expert testimony should have been ex-
cluded at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 702." On the Docket: Weisgram, Chad
et al. v. Marley Co., et al., Nw. U. MEDILL SCH. J., (visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http://
www.medill.nwu.edu/cases.srch?-database=Docket. . ./detail.srch&-search&
docket=99-016>. See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (Mar.
23, 1999) (determining principally that admissibility guidelines set forth in Daubert,
may apply to evidence other than that based upon scientific knowledge). For fur-
ther discussion of Kumho Tire, see infra notes 165-68, 179, 182 and accompanying
text. For further discussion of admissibility guidelines, see infra notes 41-43 and
50-75 and accompanying text. For discussion of Daubert, see infra notes 56-65 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. X11: p. 33
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torts makes it necessary for parties to offer expert testimony.8
While expert testimony is pervasive in all litigation, it is certainly
offered in most every environmental case.9 One scholar noted that
"an expert witness is like a flea collar. When your case is a dog, you
need something that will chase the flees away, something that will
keep your case from scratching and biting itself in front of the
jury."' 0 Unfortunately for the toxic tort plaintiff, courts scrutinize
expert causation testimony under numerous admissibility standards
and a "ruling against admissibility frequently sounds the death knell
for a plaintiff's cause of action."'I
This Comment examines the exceptional causation require-
ments of toxic tort litigation, the need for experts, the admissibility
standards governing their testimony and the nature of the scientific
evidence that plaintiffs' experts use to establish causation. 12 It be-
gins by discussing how lower courts apply admissibility standards set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals and most recently affirmed in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Recognizing that a more codified, methodical analysis may be helpful to fed-
eral judges in determining whether expert testimony meets the admissibility re-
quirements under Rule 702, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure have
proposed amendments to several of the Rules. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 (Prelimi-
nary Draft 1998). The Advisory Committee proposes to amend Rule 702 to read:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact at issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness had applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Id. (emphasis added) (italicizing words that include proposed changes); see also
Ruth E. Piller, Coping with Kumho, 24 LITIG. NEWS, Sept. 1999, at 7 (stating "IT] he
proposed amendments to Rules 701-703 are intended to codify Daubert methodical
analysis for trial courts to follow in gate-keeping situations"). Piller also stipulated
that "[t] he Judicial Conference of the United States is expected to approved [sic]
the amendments and forward them to the Supreme Court. They could become
effective December 1, 2000." Id.
8. See id. (arguing necessity of expert evidence in establishing causation). For
further discussion regarding need for expert testimony in toxic torts, see infra
notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
9. Interview with John Hyson, Professor of Law, Villanova University School of
Law, in Villanova, Pennsylvania. (Jan. 19, 2000).
10. JAMES W. MCELHANEY, McELHANEY'S TRL NOTEBOOK 469 (3d ed. 1994).
11. See Miller & Rein, supra note 7, at 567 (citation omitted).
12. For discussion of causation requirements in toxic tort litigation, see supra
note 6, and 11 and accompanying text, and see infra notes 26-35 and accompany-
ing text and note 78. For discussion of the need for experts, see infra notes 36-40
and accompanying text. For discussion of the scientific evidence with which plain-
tiffs often seek to establish causation, see infra notes 87-129 and accompanying
text.
2001]
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Charmichael13 Part Two argues that the key to admissibility may not
be found in science, but in the law. 14 This section attempts to pro-
vide theories favoring admissibility of evidence by emphasizing the
impossibility of proving causation in toxic tort litigation.' 5 Finally,
Part Three suggests that district court judges should make a con-
scious effort to understand the causation burdens confronting toxic
tort plaintiffs and apply the Daubert standards with a "liberal thrust"
favoring admissibility. 16 The passage implies that exclusion of ex-
perts testifying as to "novel sciences" is not necessarily the appropri-
ate response to an admissibility challenge.' 7 Judges should instead
take advantage of their ability to employ their own experts in order
to help them make determinations between 'junk science" and
"novel science," or they should leave credibility questions of "shaky"
but admissible expert evidence to the jury.18
I. TOXIC TORT CAUSATION EVIDENCE GENERALLY
A. Establishing Liability in Toxic Tort Claims
Toxic torts have become an exceptional area of litigation for a
variety of reasons.' 9 First, toxic tort cases are generally complex
litigation cases brought by large groups of plaintiffs claiming that
exposure to a particular substance caused injury.20 A finding of lia-
bility or even potential liability may result in the discontinuance of
a product line and bankruptcy, or a huge settlement or substantial
13. See Kumbo, 526 U.S. at 137. For discussion of admissibility standards gen-
erally, see infra notes 41-43, 50-75 and accompanying text.
14. For discussion of legal notions favoring admissibility, see infra notes 139-
86 and accompanying text.
15. For discussion of causation, see infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text
and note 78.
16. For discussion of proposed application of more "liberal" admissibility
standards favoring admissibility of expert evidence in toxic tort claims, see infra
notes 139-86 and accompanying text.
17. For discussion of legal standards favoring a less restrictive approach with
respect to admissibility determinations, see infra notes 139-86 and accompanying
text.
18. For a discussion of court-appointed experts, see infra notes 176-85 and
accompanying text. For discussion of the jury's role in weighing credibility of ex-
perts, see infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
19. See Browne, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that toxic torts constitute a "note-
worthy" area of litigation).
20. See id. at 2-3 (discussing that toxic tort litigation is noteworthy because 1)
cases involve large numbers of plaintiffs; 2) damage theories are new; and 3) cases
involve proof of causation). "Simply put, the toxic tort plaintiff attempts to estab-
lish that exposure to a particular substance caused an injury." Id.
[Vol. XII: p. 33
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judgement payable to hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs. 21 Many
common product lines have been the subjects of toxic tort actions
such as: 1) asbestos; 2) lead; 3) Bendectin; 4) DES and Thalidomi-
cide; 5) tobacco; 6) Agent Orange; 7) formaldehyde; 8) pesticides;
9) herbicides and 10) benzene.22 Typically, allegedly injured par-
ties bring action under theories of negligence, trespass, liability for
abnormally dangerous activities, strict products liability or nui-
sance. 23 While these legal causes of action are relatively traditional,
the injuries they seek to redress have been relatively new to the law
since World War 11.24 These novel injuries, which set toxic tort
cases apart from traditional tort actions and constitute a second rea-
son for which toxic torts are exceptional, include: "1) fear of future
disease; 2) increased risk of disease; and 3) medical monitoring."25
Finally, while it is generally necessary for plaintiffs seeking to estab-
lish liability in traditional tort actions to prove causation, actions
brought by toxic tort plaintiffs are distinguishable because plaintiffs
are not able to establish causation to certainty.26 It may, in fact, be
impossible for a plaintiff to show that a particular substance caused
21. See id. at 2 (discussing potential effects of toxic tort actions on
defendants).
22. See Browne, Keeley & Heirs, supra note 6 at n.14 (listing product lines that
have been subjected to toxic tort litigation). For discussion of varying approaches
with which courts analyze causation evidence among product lines, see infra note
78 and accompanying text.
23. See Browne, Keeley & Heirs, supra note 6, at n.14 (describing causes of
action under which toxic tort claims arise).
A toxic tort meets one or more of the following characteristics: 1. The
plaintiff's alleged injury is not a traumatic response; instead, the injury
results from genetic or biochemical disruption. 2. The plaintiffs expo-
sure is usually, but not necessarily, chronic and repeated. 3. The plain-
tiffs physical injuries manifest themselves after a long latency period.
Id. at n.4 (citing Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards
of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986)).
24. See Browne, Keeley & Heirs, supra note 6, at n.5 (addressing new types of
injuries alleged in toxic tort litigation).
25. See id. at 3 and n.3 (discussing new damage theories addressed in toxic
tort litigation). "[Toxic tort] cases span a variety of claims for damages, equity,
and insurance coverage." Id. at n.3.
A fear of future disease claim is a type of emotional distress claim. An
increased risk of disease claim seeks recovery for the "potential future
injury of contracting the feared disease." Finally, a medical monitoring
claim seeks recovery for diagnostic testing and medical examinations af-
ter exposure to a toxic substance in order to permit the earliest detection
and treatment if the feared disease should occur.
Id. at n.15 (citations omitted) (quoting Ernest G. Getto et.al., Toxic Tort Symposium:
Evolving Standards For Fear of Future Disease Claims in the Post-Potter Era, 10 TUL.
ENvT L.J. 307, 310-12 (1997)); see also Lin, supra note 4, at 554 (discussing medical
monitoring as potential remedy). For discussion of medical monitoring claims
and causation issues arising therefrom, see infra note 31.
26. See id. at 3 (stating that "causation cannot be proven to certainty").
20011
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injury, and it may be equally as difficult for a defendant to establish
that the particular substance in question did not cause the plain-
tiffs' injury.27 Accordingly; plaintiffs are not required to show that a
particular injury occurred at a particular time and place. 28 Plain-
tiffs will, therefore, rely on "probabilistic" evidence. 29
By using such "probabilistic" evidence to establish liability,
plaintiffs must show that they have been exposed to a harmful sub-
stance and that such exposure resulted in injury.30 Courts require
that plaintiffs establish two types of causation: general and spe-
cific. 3 1 Courts generally agree that "[g]eneral causation addresses
whether products of the same nature as defendant's products are
capable of causing the type of injuries alleged .. .; specific causa-
tion addresses whether defendant's product more likely than not
caused injuries in the particular case." 32 Specific causation, there-
27. See Buckley and Haake, supra note 3 (discussing significant role of expert
testimony in toxic tort litigation).
28. See id. (discussing causation requirements for toxic torts).
29. See id. (discussing that plaintiffs must use "probabilistic" evidence to estab-
lish causation).
30. See id. (discussing elements necessary to establish liability in toxic tort
cases).
31. See Heller v. Shaw Industries (Heller 1), No. Civ. A. 95-7657, 1997 WL
535163, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (Mem.) (discussing general and specific causation).
Buckley notes:
[The causation method] requires first that the expert determine the dos-
age of the toxin at issue to which the plaintiff was exposed .... Second,
the expert must establish "general causation" by demonstrating that, ac-
cording to scientific literature, levels of the toxin comparable to those
received by the plaintiff can cause the specific types of injuries he alleges
.... Third, the expert must establish specific causation, by demonstrat-
ing that, more likely than not, the toxin caused plaintiffs injuries in a
particular case.
Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (quoting Mancuso v. Consolidated Edison Co. of
New York, 967 F. Supp. 1437, 1445-46 (S.D.N.Y 1997)); see also Ellen Relkin, The
Sword or the Shield: Use of Commercial Regulations, Exposure Standards and Toxicological
Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 6 DicK. J. ENv. POL. 1, 2-3 (discussing general and
specific causation and exposure levels of toxic substances).
In an action for medical monitoring damages, however, plaintiffs do not have
to prove specific causation. See Lin supra note 4, at 582. Instead, plaintiffs must
prove medical necessity which requires a showing that the individual plaintiff can
benefit from a medical monitoring program. Id. The same types of evidence, how-
ever are needed in order to prove specific causation and medical monitoring. Id.
For a further discussion of causation requirements among product lines, see infra
note 78 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., HellerI, 1997 WL 535163, at *6 (Mem.) (citing Rutigliano v. Valley
Business Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D.N.J. 1996), affd, 118 F.3d 1577, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS (3d Cir. NJ. 1997)); Mascarenas v. Miles Inc., 986 F. Supp. 582,
587-88 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (discussing causation requirements); see generally Wright v.
Williamette Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1996) (requiring proof of
exposure to toxic substance in levels known to cause injury); In re Paoli Railroad
Yard Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cir. 1990) (requiring exposure as element in
[Vol. X11: p. 33
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fore, requires plaintiffs to prove, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, 1) that defendants released toxins into the environment;
2)that plaintiffs were exposed to the toxins; 3) that plaintiffs have
suffered an injury and 4) that the toxins released by defendants
caused the injury.33 Accordingly, plaintiffs must prove that they
were exposed to toxins produced by defendant at levels that exceed
normal background levels and that the duration and dosage of the
exposure were at levels significantly high to cause injury to
humans. 34 One court noted:
First an evaluation is made of the chemicals to which the
individual might have been exposed, and of the concen-
trations of these chemicals .... The second step involves
an evaluation, based upon the published scientific litera-
ture, of the exposures necessary to produce the adverse
effects associated with the chemicals to which the individ-
ual may be exposed.3 5
B. The Need for Expert Witnesses
In toxic tort cases, it is necessary for plaintiffs to provide expert
testimony in order to assist the trier of fact in drawing conclu-
sions.36 An expert witness "is one, who, by training, education, or
toxic tort); Maddy v. Vulcan Materials, Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1533 (Kan.
1990) (discussing that plaintiff must demonstrate that she was, in fact, exposed to
harmful substance).
33. See Heller I, 1997 WL 535163, at *6 (MEM); see also Buckley & Haake, supra
note 3 (outlining general and specific causation). "Courts have correctly recog-
nized, however, that the issue of specific causation cannot be examined in a vac-
uum. Courts must consider the doses to which the plaintiff was allegedly exposed.
After all, [sic] in sufficient quantities, just about any substance, including water,
can be toxic." Id.
34. See Hellerl, 1997 WL 535163, *6 (Mem.) (citing Mateer v. U.S. Aluminum,
1989 WL 60442, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 1989)).
35. Cavallo v. Star Enter., 893 F.Supp. 756, 764 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 1998 WL
6290 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1998).
36. SeeJoseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion
of the Adversarial Process, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 355. Sanders stipulates:
It is commonplace that expert testimony plays an important role in civil
litigation, especially in tort litigation. Recently, its ubiquity has been doc-
umented in several studies. For example, a study of 529 civil jury trials in
California between 1985 and 1986 revealed that experts testified in 86%
of the cases and that an average of 3.8 experts testified in each case. Ex-
perts appeared in 100% of the products liability cases .... The wide-
spread use of experts is beyond conjecture.
Id. at 357-58 (footnotes omitted); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing that expert
may testify in form of opinion or otherwise if scientific, technical or other special-
ized knowledge will assist trier of fact).
2001]
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experience has acquired a special level of skill or knowledge in
some art, science, profession, or calling."37
Commentators note that litigants may use experts to establish
exposure to a particular substance and to determine the nature of
plaintiffs' injuries.38 But, causation experts, who seek to link expo-
sure and injury in order to establish both general and specific cau-
sation, are most frequently used in toxic tort litigation.3 9 Because
of the nature of the causation requirements in toxic torts, "the suc-
cess or failure of the case may well hinge on the . . . expert
testimony. "40
Courts have the ability, however, to exclude expert opinion evi-
dence if it fails to comply with certain standards.41 Admissibility
standards are in place to assure that "experts adhere to the same
standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in their profes-
sional work. ' 42 Accordingly, testimony in toxic tort litigation based
upon 'junk" science that is prepared solely in anticipation of litiga-
tion will be inadmissible as evidence. 43 If a court determines that
37. See Hon. Mark 1. Bernstein, Expert Testimony in Pennsylvania, 68 TEMP. L.
REv. n.2 (1995) (citing PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVIL JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS, Instruction 5.30 Pa. Sup. Ct. Comm. for Proposed Standard Jury Instruc-
tions 1981; PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Pa.
Sup. Ct. Comm. for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions 1991).
38. See Browne, Keeley & Heirs, supra note 6, at n.19 (citing L. Grant Foster, A
Case Study in Toxic Tort Causation: Scientific and Legal Standards Work Against Recovery
for Victims, 19 ENVTL. L. 141, 149 (1988)).
39. See id. (analyzing why causation experts are the most frequently used).
40. Cynthia H. Cwik, Guarding the Gate: Expert Evidence Admissibility, 25 No. 4
A.B.A.J. SEC. LITIG. 6, (Summer 1999). The commentator stated:
In toxic tort and products liability cases, a motion in limine to exclude
expert evidence under Daubert is often coupled with a motion for sum-
mary judgement. More specifically, counsel will often argue that, if the
motion to exclude expert evidence is granted, the other side will not be
able to establish a key element of the case--causation, for example-and
the case therefore must be dismissed.
Id. at 10.
41. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding
that expert testimony must be reliable and relevant).
42. See Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV. 699, 735 (Spring
1998) (quoting Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996)).
43. See Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the
Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715,
719-21, 748-49 (1994) (theorizing thatjudges should screen out "junk science"); see
generally Peter Huber, GALILEO'S REVENGE: Junk Science in the Courtroom (1991) (dis-
cussing whimsical nature with which experts draw conclusions and comparing dif-
ferences between scientific standards for accepting hypothesis and legal standards
for determining reliability of such acceptance); Kenneth J. Chesebro, Peter Huber's
Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1637 (1993) (discussing Huber's account ofjunk
science); see also Browne, Keeley & Heirs, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that legal schol-
ars have "lamented the use of expert testimony in toxic tort cases because 'junk
science' is infiltrating the courtroom").
[Vol. X11: p. 33
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proffered expert evidence is inadmissible, plaintiffs may fail to es-
tablish one of the necessary elements of a toxic tort claim - specifi-
cally, causation.44 The claim, therefore, will not survive. 45 Since
exclusion of such evidence is usually outcome determinative, the
real liability battle is often waged before the case even materializes
in a courtroom. 46 Accordingly, before the trial commences, coun-
sel will often file motions to exclude or motions in limine arguing
that the opposing party's expert evidence should be excluded on
the grounds that it does not satisfy admissibility standards. 47 If the
trial court agrees with a defendant's motion to exclude expert evi-
dence, a plaintiff may have a significantly more difficult, if not im-
possible, time proving causation. 48 On the other hand, if the trial
judge disagrees with defendant's assertions, the admission of expert
testimony may provide an incentive for defendant to settle. 49
C. Admissibility Standards for Expert Evidence
The admissibility standards enumerated by the Federal Rules
of Evidence with respect to scientific evidence and the cases that
interpret such rules are applicable in toxic tort litigation because
expert witnesses "use the language of science . . . to present their
arguments."50 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at
issue, a witness qualified as an expert... may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise." 51 Accordingly, if expert testi-
44. See Chesebro, supra note 43, at 1638 (showing fatal effect inadmissible evi-
dence may have on plaintiffs case).
45. See id. (stating that summary judgement may be appropriate where plain-
tiff is unable to establish causation with expert evidence).
46. See Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (discussing pre-trial issues of admission
with respect to expert testimony).
47. See Judge Harvey Brown, Procedural Issues Under Daubert, 36 Hous. L. REv.
1133, 1139 (Winter, 1999) (discussing pre-trial motions filed in order to request
exclusion of testimony). Parties usually raise expert evidence admissibility chal-
lenges at what has become known as a Daubert hearing. See id. at 1139, n.39.
Courts have not explained, however, what this hearing "is, how it is invoked, when
it is to be conducted relative to the commencement of trial, and whether it is
required." Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 422-23 (Tex.
1998) (Hecht, J., dissenting).
48. See Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (illustrating consequences of exclusion
of expert evidence).
49. See id. (discussing possible consequences of admission of expert
testimony).
50. See Browne, Keeley & Heirs, supra note 6, at 3-4 (discussing experts' use of
scientific knowledge to establish causation).
51. FED. R. EviD. 702. Most states have adopted rules of evidence very similar
to the federal rules and have accordingly employed the Daubert standard with re-
2001]
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mony is not based upon "scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge," or if such evidence does not "assist the trier of fact,"
the opinion of the expert is inadmissible.52
1. Reliability and Relevance - Standards and Requirements.
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence provide generally that
"all relevant evidence is admissible," 53 courts have the power to ex-
clude any and all expert evidence that is not both relevant and reli-
able.5 4 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence supersedes prior
common law notions of relevancy and reliability in all federal juris-
dictions and most states. 55 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., the
spect to admissibility of expert witnesses. See Lin, supra note 4, at n.15 (listing
states which have accepted and rejected Daubert).
52. FED. R. EVD. 702. For further discussion of admissibility requirements,
see infra notes 53-75 and accompanying text.
53. See FED. R. EviD. 402. For further discussion of courts' power to exclude
expert evidence, see infra notes 61, 76-77, 79-82, 132, 134-38, 166, 185 and accom-
panying text and note 63.
54. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (noting that under the Rules, the trial judge
must ensure that scientific testimony or evidence admitted is both relevant and
reliable). "Relevant evidence" is defined as any evidence which "has a tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id. at 587
(citing FED. R. EvIn. 401). Reliable evidence is that which pertains to scientist's
knowledge and is based upon good grounds. Id. at 590.
55. See id. at 587 (holding that "general acceptance test" is no longer standard
by which evidence would be evaluated in federal trials). In 1923, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (1923), which effectively established a common law test for the admissibility
of evidence - the "general acceptance test." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-87. In Fye,
the relevant issue turned on the admissibility of evidence derived from a systolic
blood pressure deception test which was a crude predecessor to the polygraph. See
Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The Daubert Court noted:
In what has become a famous (perhaps infamous) passage, the then
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia described the device and its
operation and declared: "Just when a scientific principle or discovery
crosses the line between the experimental and the demonstrable stages is
difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principle must be recognized, and the courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs."
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-86 (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014).
In Daubert, which was decided seventy years after Frye, petitioners attacked the
continuing authority of the "general acceptance test" and argued that the admissi-
bility standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede the Frye test. See id. at
587. The Supreme Court agreed. See id. at 589 (stating that general acceptance
test, "absent from and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should
not be applied in federal trials"). Some states, however, continue to use the Frye
standard and have not adopted Daubert. See Lin, supra note 4, at n.15 (listing states
that reject Daubert and which have retained Frye).
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United States Supreme Court interpreted Rule 702 and concluded
that "pertinent evidence based upon scientific principles" will sat-
isfy both the relevancy and reliability requirement. 56
Focusing primarily upon the words, "scientific knowledge," in
order to interpret Rule 702's notion of reliability, the Court estab-
lished that in order to qualify as scientific knowledge, the expert
witness's inference or assertion upon which he or she based his or
her opinion must be derived from scientific method and supported
by "appropriate validation-i.e. 'good grounds,' based on what is
known. '57 This requirement established a standard of reliability,
and each step of an expert's analysis must pass this standard. 58
The relevancy standard of the Federal Rules of Evidence re-
quires that the proffered evidence "assist the trier of fact" in the
sense that the conclusions generated and proffered as evidence
must "fit" with the facts of the case. 59 In other words, the Daubert
Court interpreted Rule 702 to require that the expert testimony
"must have a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
precondition to admissibility."60
56. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (discussing relevancy and reliability require-
ments); see also Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999)
(holding that Daubert interpretation of Rule 702 and admissibility factors enumer-
ated by Supreme Court in Daubert are also applicable to non-scientific expert
evidence).
57. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (quoting "[Tihe subject of an expert's testimony
must be scientific ... knowledge.") (footnote omitted). The Daubert Court deter-
mined that "scientific knowledge" means "any body of known facts or... any body
of ideas inferred from facts or accepted as truths on good grounds" in the methods
and procedures of science. Id. (citing WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 1252 (1986)).
58. See id. (stating "[i]n short, the requirement that an expert's testimony per-
tain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability").
59. Id. at 591 (holding "[R]ule 702 further requires that the evidence or testi-
mony 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in
issue.' This condition goes primarily to relevance."); see also FED. R. EvID. 402 (re-
quiring that evidence be relevant).
60. Id. at 592 (stating that "Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a valid
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility").
"The consideration has aptly been described by Judge Becker as one of 'fit.'" Id. at
591 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)). "'Fit' is
not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scien-
tific validity for other unrelated purposes." Id. See generally In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 748 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing relevance as it applies
to admissibility of testimony); see also Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evi-
dence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1556-57 (1996) (discussing scientific validity and its
potential role in determining relevance).
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2. Additional Guidelines for Determining Admissibility
In Daubert, the Court provided some "general observations" in
order to "help" federal judges determine whether a particular sci-
entific theory or technique is "scientific knowledge that will assist
the trier of fact. '61 These factors provide a basis upon which attor-
neys disputing admissibility can direct the court's attention. 62 The
Daubert factors, which focus primarily on reliability, are: 1) whether
the theory or technique can be or has been tested; 2) whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publica-
tion; 3) whether the theory or technique has been "generally ac-
cepted" within the scientific community; 4) whether a potential rate
of error exists in cases involving particular scientific techniques;
and 5) whether standards which control the technique's operation
exist and were maintained. 63 Upon remand to the Ninth Circuit,
that court added an additional factor to the five offered by the Su-
preme Court.64 The Ninth Circuit held that courts should also con-
sider "whether the experts are proposing to testify about matters
growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted
independent of litigation, or whether they have developed their
opinions expressly for the purposes of testifying." 65
The Daubert opinion was open-ended and vague. 66 Several
Post-Daubert opinions sought to "put some meat on Daubert
61. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. These "general observations" are commonly
referred to as the Daubert factors. See, e.g., Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137(referring to
the additional standards set forth in Daubert as "Daubert factors"); Heller v. Shaw
Industries Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 144 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing the "Daubert factors"); Paoli,
35 F.3d at 742 n.8 (adding to Daubert factors by borrowing some from the Third
Circuit's decision in Downing. Some courts also refer to these factors as the "Down-
ing factors," as the Daubert Court "borrowed [them] from the many [that] Chief
Justice Becker listed in [Downing]." Kent v. Howell Electric Moors, et al., No. 96-
7221, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10940 at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 1999).
62. See Nina Gussak, Partner at Pepper Hamilton, LLP, Philadelphia, Pa. and
Chair of the Health Effects Litigation Practice, Address, "Keeping Junk Science
Out of the Courtroom" (Feb. 10, 2000).
63. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (listing some "general observations" in-
tended to assist federal judges in their "gate[-] keeping" capacities). See, e.g.,
Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 1998) (listing same
Daubert factors). Sometimes courts and commentators mention that there are four
Daubert factors. See, e.g., Heller v. Shaw Industries, 167 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir.
1998) (citing four factors by combining two and listing as one).
64. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1317
(9th Cir. 1995) (discussing admissibility standards of expert evidence).
65. See id. at 1317 (adding additional factor to those enumerated by Supreme
Court).
66. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's notes (noting that Daubert opin-
ion was open ended and vague).
[Vol. XII: p. 33
12
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss1/2
WHICH WAY?
bones."67 For example, approximately one year after Daubert, the
Third Circuit decided In re Paoli.68 In Paoli, the Third Circuit set
forth additional factors that "a district court should take into ac-
count when evaluating whether a particular scientific methodology
is reliable."69 These factors are: 1) the degree to which the testify-
ing expert is qualified; 70 2) the "nonjudicial uses to which the scien-
tific technique is put; a71 and 3) the relationship of a particular
technique to the established modes of scientific analysis. 72 These
additional guidelines effectively gave district courts that chose to
follow Paoli a more exhaustive list of criteria under which to ex-
clude testimony.73 Many courts throughout the country have incor-
porated the Paoli factors as admission criteria in addition to the
Daubert factors, while other courts and authorities presented
variations of these admissibility standards by imposing their own
sets of factors.74  The Supreme Court, however, has expressed
67. See id. (discussing post-Daubert opinions). For further discussion of post-
Daubert holdings, see infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
68. See In re Paoli Railroad Yard Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 832 (3d Cir. 1990) (de-
ciding case on August 31, 1994, and amending October 17, 1994).
69. Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8 (listing eight total Daubert/Paoli factors).
70. See id. at 742; see also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d
Cir. 1985).
71. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238-39.
72. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 (setting forth admissibility criteria in addition to
those enumerated in Daubert).
73. See, e.g., Heller v. Shaw Industries Inc., No. Civ.A. 95-7657, 1997 WL
535163, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 1997) (Mem.) (stating, "in determining the valid-
ity of the methodology and principles underlying an expert's opinion, the district
court should take into consideration the following factors.. . .") (emphasis added).
The district court then listed eight total factors - the five observations of the
Supreme Court in Daubert plus the three additional factors enumerated in Paoli.
Id.
74. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582 at n.12 (citing Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-
39; see also 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE p 702-03 (1988);
McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA
L.REv. 879, 911-12 (1982); Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D.
187, 231 (1982)). See generally Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 89 F.3d
594, 600 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing Paoli's methodology/conclusion distinction);
Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing Paoli's em-
phasis on qualifications of the expert). Other courts have proposed criteria in
addition to Daubert. See, e.g., Lust, 89 F.3d at 594 (noting that improper extrapola-
tion may be proper basis for exclusion of testimony); Braun v. Lorillard, Inc., 84
F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing that it is improper for testimony to be
grounded in one methodology that is transposed from one area to a completely
different area of inquiry); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 800 (E.D. Va.
1995) (noting that expert reliance on anecdotal evidence alone may not survive
"gate-keeping" scrutiny); Porter v. Whitehall labs., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 615 (7th Cir.
1993) (noting that formation of expert conclusion solely on basis of temporal prox-
imity is inconsistent with scientific method and therefore, inadmissible); Chikovsky
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 832 F. Supp. 341, 350 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding
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no opinion on the factor other than those enumerated in
Daubert.75
Although Daubert provides guidance for the admissibility of tes-
timony based upon "scientific, technical or other specialized knowl-
edge," it does not hand judges a step-by-step guide for the
application of scientific principles, nor does it provide bright-line
standards governing admissibility. 76 Accordingly, trial judges have
been left to subjectively apply the guidelines provided by the Rules
of Evidence, Daubert and other binding precedent when exercising
their "gate-keeping roles."77 As a result, different jurisdictions use
varying approaches across product lines.78 Some legal scholars as-
that expert evidence derived from insufficient connection between expert's opin-
ion and case is inadmissible).
75. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580.
76. See Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARv. L. REv.
1532, 1556-57 (1996) (commenting on Daubert's failure to provide step-by-step
guides for admissibility determinations); see also Heller v. Shaw Industries Inc., 167
F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999) (refusing to uphold requirement that expert must
always rely upon published studies to reach conclusions on causation because "to
so hold would .. . effectively resurrect a Frye-like bright-line standard"); Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael et al., 526 U.S. 137, 140 (1999).
We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a schematism that segregates
expertise by type while mapping certain kinds of questions to certain
kinds of experts. Life and the legal cases that it generates are too com-
plex to warrant so definitive a match .... Rather, we conclude that the
trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case
how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is
reliable.
Id.; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598 (C.J. Rehnquist concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (stating that Court's "general observations" are "vague and abstract").
77. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing admissibility standards for expert testi-
mony); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (interpreting Rule 702 and discussing fed-
eral trial judge's role as "gate keeper"). Rule 702 is not the only Rule of Evidence
applicable to expert testimony. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 703, 706, & 403. In sum-
mary, these rules provide:
[A] judge assessing a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule
702 should also be mindful of other applicable rules. Rule 703 provides
that expert opinions based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay are to be
admitted only if the facts or data are "of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject." Rule 706 allows the court at its discretion to procure the assis-
tance of an expert of its own choosing. Finally, Rule 403 permits the
exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury .
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
78. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Causation in Governmental Regulation and Toxic
Torts, 76 WASH. U.L.Q. 1307 (Winter, 1998) (discussing difference between causa-
tion requirements for regulation of toxic substances and causation requirements
for liability in toxic tort cases). See, e.g., Capra, supra note 42, at 737 (arguing for
less-restrictive approach to admissibility determinations under Daubert); Brown,
supra note 47, at 1134 (promoting strict approach to admissibility determinations
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sert that courts are excluding more testimony than is appropriate
under Daubert.79 One commentator noted that "post-Daubert writ-
ings, including ... court opinions, have pushed the district courts
in the direction of a more activist role in which the court conducts
its own trial of the experts and excludes experts whom the court
believes are wrong because their underlying methodology or evi-
dence is controversial."80 Another scholar stated that trial judges
by stating that testimony is only admissible if it "can pass eight different gates")
(emphasis added).
In establishing liability in all jurisdictions and among all product lines, plain-
tiffs must prove causation. For a discussion of causation elements, see supra notes
6, 11, 26-35 and accompanying text and note 78. All tort law similarly requires that
parties prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence, but the threshold of
proof required for regulatory agencies is reasonably different and lower than that
required in tort law. See Sutera v. The Perrier Group of America, 986 F. Supp. 655,
664 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing Wright v. Williamette Indus., 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 (8th
Cir. 1996)). For example, in Sutera, plaintiff sought to establish that benzene in-
gested through Perrier water caused cancer. Id. at 659. The court held that the
plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, both general and spe-
cific causation. Id. The court rejected plaintiffs "no-threshold" causation model.
Id.
Regardless of the product line, however, the standards governing admissibility
of causation evidence are not uniformly applied throughout the federal and state
judiciary because both the federal government and regulatory agencies set differ-
ing exposure levels for toxic substances. See Relkin, supra note 31, at 2 (discussing
exposure levels). Relkin notes that "in toxic tort actions[,] disputes naturally arise
as to the import of the varied agency-set levels, particularly when exposure of a
plaintiff is different from the exposure intended by the EPA or OSHA." Id. at 2.
While governmental levels are somewhat instructive, courts do not assume that
exposure to levels below these set levels is trivial or that exposure at levels that
exceed these set levels is proof of causation. See id. at 5. As a result, courts have
inconsistently given weight to governmental levels across product lines. See Gideon
v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1985) (using OSHA's
standard for permissible airborne exposure and finding for defendant because
plaintiff was exposed at levels below this standard); Quinn v. Amphenol Corp., No.
94-1631, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 30788 (4th Cir. Oct. 26, 1995) (using toxicity levels
for trichloroethylene promulgated by EPA and Department of Health and Envi-
ronmental Control but nevertheless affirming dismissal of plaintiffs claims even
though exposure exceeded such levels); German v. Federal Home Loan Mortg.
Corp., 885 F. Supp. 537, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (using toxicity levels for lead promul-
gated by Center for Disease Control and denying defendant's motion for summary
judgement even though plaintiffs exposure did not reach such levels).
79. See Anthony Z. Roisman, Expert Testimony After Daubert, SA85 ALI-ABA 353,
356 (1996) (discussing that district court judges have taken overly activist role in
determining admissibility).
80. Id. Roisman further notes:
This trend has encouraged district courts not only to resolve general is-
sues such as whether an expert properly relied upon the kind of evidence
appropriate for the opinion offered, or in general, used the appropriate
scientific methodology, but also very narrow and specific questions such
as whether the expert's opinion about the significance of a particular
study is right and whether the expert has given proper weight to contrary
evidence.
Id. (citation omitted).
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may not elevate themselves to the role of "St. Peter at the gates of
heaven, performing a searching inquiry into the depth of an expert
witness' soul-separating the saved from the damned."8' Other
commentators applaud the most restrictive scrutiny with respect to
admissibility of expert causation testimony on the grounds that
judges need to separate the "scientific wheat from the charlatan
chaff. 8 2
D. Proving Causation with Novel Methodoligies
Despite the varying standards with which courts scrutinize ex-
pert testimony, the results of such scrutiny in toxic tort litigation
are relatively uniform- testimony of causation experts is largely ex-
cluded.83 The scientific uncertainty regarding the causal relation-
ship between exposure to a particular substance and plaintiff's
injuries undoubtedly contributes to the exclusion of expert evi-
dence.8 4 The exclusion of expert evidence is especially problematic
for toxic tort plaintiffs in the environmental context where plain-
81. See Capra, supra note 42, at 737 (discussing shortcomings of expert evi-
dence admissibility standards). Some commentators argue that plaintiffs should
not be required to prove causation at all because the present nature of causation
standards in toxic torts negatively impacts plaintiffs. See Margaret A. Berger, Elimi-
nating General Causation: Notes Toward a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 2117 (1997) (arguing that plaintiffs should no longer be required
to prove causation in toxic tort cases). Another scholar notes:
Under Berger's proposal, a plaintiff could recover from a firm that ex-
poses her to a toxic substance simply by proving that she suffered an in-
jury of a type that might be attributable to such exposure and that the
firm did not adequately test the substance to determine its toxic effects or
did not adequately warn the public of those effects.
Pierce, supra note 78, at 1310.
82. See Buckley and Haake, supra note 3 (stating that "the litany of toxic tort
cases decided after Daubert demonstrates [that] the American judicial system [is]
quite capable of assessing the validity of expert testimony .. .and separating the
scientific wheat from the charlatan chaff').
83. See Lin supra note 4, at 565 (discussing that Daubert led to various out-
comes). Others have commented on the effect Daubert has on the exclusion of
testimony:
Even before Daubert was handed down, it was predicted that many federal
district courts would read the decision as requiring their active and
searching involvement in reviewing challenges to scientific evidence, es-
pecially evidence proffered to link allegedly hazardous substances to spe-
cific disease conditions. These courts have taken advantage of both the
substantive and procedural flexibility offered by Daubert They have re-
jected speculative testimony, playing on a general fear of controversial
substances, and subjected proposed causality testimony to scrutiny and
challenge by party and independent experts in extensive Rule 104
hearings.
See Miller & Rein, supra note 7, at 571-72.
84. See Pierce, supra note 78, at 1037 (discussing difficulties plaintiffs encoun-
ter in proving causation in toxic tort litigation).
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tiffs must prove, for example, that a chemical spill, emission or
other exposure caused injury. 85 While it seems that the use of cer-
tain sciences and methodologies by plaintiffs may aid in the nearly
impossible task of establishing causation, the employment of these
"novel sciences" may simultaneously cause a court to reject the prof-
fered testimony under Daubert.8 6 These "novel" methodologies
upon which experts rely to establish that a particular substance
caused an injury include: 1) epidemiological studies; 2)case studies;
3) in vivo and in vitro animal studies and 4) pharmacological
studies.87
The study of epidemiology seeks to determine the causes of
disease in humans. 88 With respect to the establishment of causa-
tion in toxic tort litigation, this science is aimed at proving general,
as opposed to specific, causation. 89 In the environmental context,
for example, epidemiologists attempt to prove that exposure to an
alleged toxic substance is (or is not) sufficient to cause injury to
humans by comparing "control groups of unexposed individuals to
groups of individuals exposed to a hypothetical cause of the disease
being studied to determine whether exposed individuals have a
greater risk of manifesting that disease." 90 After compiling the re-
sults of an epidemiological study, an epidemiologist can derive a
"relative risk ratio" which "compares the incidence of disease occur-
rence in exposed individuals to the incidence of disease occurrence
in unexposed individuals."9 1 The higher the ratio, the more likely
it is that a particular case of a disease was associated with the expo-
sure.9 2 Most commentators and courts agree that results of epide-
miological studies are the most helpful and relevant evidence in
determining general causation in a toxic tort case.93
85. For discussion of causation elements in toxic tort cases, see supra notes 6,
11, 26-35 and accompanying text and note 78.
86. For discussion of novel sciences in establishing causation and the corre-
sponding admissibility problems, see infra notes 87-129 and accompanying text.
87. See Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (describing methodologies upon which
experts base conclusions in toxic tort litigation).
88. See id. (discussing science of epidemiology).
89. See id. (citing Linda Bailey et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFER-
ENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 126 (Federal Judicial Center 1994)).
90. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D.Or. 1996)
(discussing roles of epidemiologists).
91. See Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (discussing relative risk ratios in epide-
miological studies).
92. See id. (noting that higher relative risk ratio indicates higher risk of
exposure).
93. See id. (noting that epidemiological studies are considered the most help-
ful); see also In re Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223,
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Although courts have found significant epidemiological evi-
dence to be helpful, Daubert may still preclude admissibility.94
Courts require plaintiffs to prove that a particular substance more
likely than not caused the plaintiffs injury.95 An epidemiological
study, therefore, must produce a relative risk ratio of greater than
two (which means that there is more than a fifty-per-cent chance
that the exposure was associated with the disease in question) in
order to establish general causation by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.96 Most likely, if the evidence fails this test, it will be ex-
cluded under Daubert as unreliable. 97
Although on remand the Ninth Circuit in Daubert held that a
relative risk ratio of greater than two is not an absolute prerequisite
when establishing causation, courts have generally disallowed evi-
dence that does not meet this standard. 98 If epidemiological stud-
ies, standing alone, would be insufficient to establish causation,
experts may try to combine the insufficient results with the results
of other epidemiologic, clinical or scientific studies in an attempt to
withstand the rigors of Daubert scrutiny.99 History tells us, however,
that such efforts may be futile. 100 Several examples may provide
evidence of such skepticism.
1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that results of epidemiologic studies can be of criti-
cal importance when establishing causation).
94. See General Electric v. Joiner, 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1326-27 (N.D. Ga.
1994) (holding that epidemiological evidence is insufficient under Daubert); see also
Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (discussing that epidemiological evidence will not
always survive Daubert).
95. See Daubert II, 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting DeLuca v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990)). The Daubert II court
noted that "for an epidemiological study to show causation under a preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, 'the relative risk ratio of limb reduction defects
arising from the epidemiological data . . . will, at a minimum, have to exceed
[two].'" Id.
96. See Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321 (discussing relative risk ratios in epidemio-
logic studies); see also Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (noting that relative risk ratio
of greater than two means that there is more than a 50% chance that exposure was
associated with disease in question).
97. For discussion of Daubert's reliability standards, see supra notes 56-58, 61-
65 and accompanying text.
98. See Daubert I, 43 F.3d at 1321 (noting that courts should not automatically
exclude evidence having relative risk ratios less than two). Nevertheless, the Ninth
Circuit in Daubert excluded evidence having a relative risk ratio of less than two.
Id.
99. See Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (discussing methodologies in addition
to epidemiologic studies that experts may employ to establish causation).
100. For discussion of novel sciences that courts have held insufficient to es-
tablish causation under Daubert, see supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text, and
see infra notes 101-29 and accompanying text.
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In Casey v. Ohio Medical Products,101 a 1995 decision from the
Northern District of California, the plaintiff attempted, through the
introduction of a compilation of case studies, to prove that expo-
sure to halothane while working as an anesthesiologist caused him
to contract hepatitis. 10 2 The court held that the expert testimony
did not satisfy the Daubert requirements because case studies "sim-
ply describe reported phenomena without comparison to the rate
at which the phenomena occur in the general population . . .do
not isolate and exclude potentially alternative causes; and do not
investigate or explain the mechanism of causation." 10 3
Similarly, courts have held that causation evidence derived
from animal testing will not usually satisfy the Daubert require-
ments.10 4 Toxicological studies, based upon animal testing, are
often used in order to assess how much of a particular substance is
harmful, if at all, to humans. 10 5 In drawing conclusions, scientists
study the effects upon animals of exposure to high levels of toxins,
extrapolate an incidence of disease at lower, more realistic levels
and translate the results of the extrapolation into an expression of
human risk. 106 However, the results of such studies have a very lim-
ited impact on causation in toxic tort cases.10 7 The Eastern District
of New York held in In re Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation
that "[t]he animal studies are not helpful in the instant case be-
cause they involve different biological species. They are of so little
probative force and are so potentially misleading as to be inadmissi-
ble."' 08 Some commentators state that the use of "animal toxicity
101. 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
102. See id.
103. Id. at 1385; see also Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387,
1411 (D.Or. 1996) (stating that case studies are insufficient basis upon which to
make causation conclusions); see also Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (discussing
case studies).
104. See Casey, 877 F.Supp. at 1385 n.94 (citing In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); National Bank of Commerce
v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1527 (E.D. Ark. 1996); Jack L. Landau &
Hugh O'Riordan, Of Mice and Men: The Admissibility of Animal Studies to Prove Causa-
tion in Toxic Tort Litigation, 25 IDAOH L. REv. 521, 523 (1989)).
105. See Casey, 877 F.Supp. at 1385 (discussing goals of toxicological studies).
106. See Landau & O'Riordan, supra note 104, at 536-37 (discussing methodol-
ogies employed in toxicology).
107. See General Electric v. Joiner, 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1326-27 (N.D. Ga.
1994) (holding that animal studies linking high doses of chemical to liver cancer
did not satisfy Daubert).
108. In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1241; see also Buckley & Haake, supra
note 3 (listing cases with similar holdings on the causation issue).
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studies to prove causation in toxic tort trials is dangerous and
improper."109
Evidence from pharmacological studies provides another basis
upon which experts often rely when reaching causation conclusions
in toxic tort litigation. 110 Pharmacology involves the comparison of
the chemical structure of compounds with known toxicity levels to
chemical structures of compounds of unknown toxicity in order to
estimate the toxicity of the latter.11" ' Results based upon such com-
parisons, however, when proffered as causation evidence, rarely sur-
vive Daubert scrutiny because such studies are often conflicting and
experts can rarely provide a scientifically valid basis for making
comparisons between chemical structures." 2
Plaintiffs and experts also tried to establish causation with evi-
dence derived from a differential diagnosis and from evidence ob-
tained by clinical ecologists. 113 Differential diagnosis is the "basic
method of internal medicine."' 1 4 Courts have held that "when a
doctor employs standard diagnostic techniques, his or her testi-
mony is much more readily admissible." ' 1 5 The Third Circuit held
in Paoli that doctors arriving at novel conclusions should be able to
testify thereto as long as the techniques employed which led to the
conclusion are reliable. 1 6 The Paoli court also noted that differen-
tial diagnosis is a reliable basis upon which to base conclusions." 7
Part of a reliable differential diagnosis, however, involves ruling out
109. Landau & O'Riordan, supra note 104, at 523 (discussing use of animal
testing as evidence in toxic tort cases).
110. See Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (discussing use of pharmacology in
toxic tort litigation); see also Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference
Guide on Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 185 (Federal
Judicial Center 1994) (discussing use of pharmacology as evidence).
111. See Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (discussing methodologies of
pharmacology).
112. See National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490,
1526 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (excluding pharmacological evidence); Schudel v. General
Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 1997) (excluding testimony because expert
failed to establish that it was scientifically acceptable to draw general conclusions
about the toxicity of chemicals in question from studies of other chemicals).
113. See Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (discussing differential diagnosis and
clinical ecology); see also Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir.
1999) (discussing expert's use of differential diagnosis).
114. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 755 (3d Cir. 1994).
115. Id. at 759 n.27 (discussing importance of diagnostic techniques).
116. See id.
117. See id.; see also Baker v. National Health Products, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 100,
102 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (admitting expert evidence based partly on differential
diagnosis).
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alternative possible causes of an injury.' 18 While a plaintiffs expert
is usually not required to eliminate all possible alternative causes, if
a defendant points to a possible alternative cause, and plaintiffs
expert can offer no explanation, plaintiffs differential diagnosis will
likely be inadmissible.' 19 For example, in the 1999 Third Circuit
case, Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc.,120 plaintiff claimed that exposure
to chemical emissions from carpeting caused the injury.' 2 1 Plaintiff
offered causation testimony based partly upon differential diagno-
sis.122 The defendant pointed to possible alternative causes of
plaintiffs injury.1 2 3 The Third Circuit in Heller held that plaintiff's
expert offered more than "no explanation," but the court neverthe-
less excluded the evidence as unreliable. 124 Similarly, differential
diagnosis presents problems for environmental toxic tort plaintiffs
because it is unlikely that an expert will be able to rule out or at
least minimize the probability of contribution to causation for every
alternative cause a defendant offers. 125 Furthermore, differential
diagnosis offers evidence only for specific causation, and while such
evidence may be helpful, it will undoubtedly be insufficient to es-
tablish a claim.' 26
118. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 579 n.27 (discussing differential diagnosis as scien-
tific evidence).
119. See id.
120. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 156 (emphasis added) (discussing defendant's role
in rebutting results of differential diagnosis performed by plaintiffs expert); see
also Paoli, 35 F.3d at 759 (noting that defendants can point to possible alternative
causes); Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994) (exclud-
ing testimony because plaintiffs expert offered no explanation when defendant
pointed to possible alternative causes of plaintiffs injuries); Cavallo v. Star Enter.,
892 F. Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va. 1995) (discussing admissibility requirements for
differential diagnosis).
121. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 151 (discussing plaintiffs cause of action).
122. See id. (discussing expert's offer of differential diagnosis as evidence).
123. See id. at 156-57 (discussing plaintiffs expert's differential diagnosis and
defendant's challenge).
124. See id. at 156 (holding that district court wrongly excluded evidence on
grounds that plaintiff failed to rule out all possible alternative causes). The Third
Circuit determined that an expert need only offer more than "no explanation" in
response to a challenge by defendant. See id. at 156-57. In Heller, the court deter-
mined that plaintiffs expert offered more than "no explanation." See id. The
Third Circuit, however, affirmed the exclusion of the expert on reliability grounds.
See id.
125. See Cavallo, 892 F. Supp. at 771 (stating that if "other possible causes of
an injury cannot be ruled out, or at least the probability of their contribution to
causation minimized, then the 'more likely than not' threshold for proving causa-
tion may not be met").
126. See Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (discussing seeming inadequacy of
differential diagnosis in proving causation). For discussion of specific causation
and its role in establishing liability in toxic tort cases, see supra notes 29-35 and
accompanying text.
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Toxic tort plaintiffs sometimes offer causation evidence based
upon clinical ecology. 127 "Clinical ecology is a relatively new and
controversial field of medicine." 128 Under a toxic tort theory, plain-
tiff may seek, with expert testimony, to establish that exposure to a
substance released by the defendant has resulted in Multiple Chem-
ical Sensitivity (MCS), a condition brought on by "various kinds of
environmental insults [that] depress a person's immune system so
that the exposed person.., becomes hypersensitive to other chemi-
cals and naturally occurring substances." 129 Apparently because of
the novelty of the condition and the unwillingness to recognize
clinical ecology as a valid science, courts have held without excep-
tion that evidence proffered to establish causation of MCS does not
withstand Daubert.130
Unless toxic tort plaintiffs can introduce as causation evidence
an epidemiological study resulting in a relative ratio of greater than
two (which, incidentally, would only contribute to a general causa-
tion conclusion), it seems that they could be "out of luck" if they try
to establish causation under any of the aforementioned scientific
methodologies or theories.131 If these documented methodologies
cannot survive a Daubert inquiry, from what other sources can a
plaintiff extrapolate valid causation evidence? "Which way do we
go, Judge?" Maybe the answer will not be found by differently ap-
plying or moderating scientific theories, but by arguing differently
the legal standards by which courts govern the admissibility of such
evidence. 132
II. ARGUING DAUBERT FROM A DIFFERENT ANGLE
A. Plaintiffs may find help within Daubert itself
In Daubert, the Supreme Court noted that a number of authori-
ties, have offered additional factors that are intended to "help"
127. See Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (discussing clinical ecology as evi-
dence of causation in toxic torts).
128. Id.; see also Lin, supra note 4, at 584-85 (noting that "even clinical ecology
has found its way into some litigation, despite vociferous criticism by mainstream
medicine").
129. See id.
130. See Buckley & Haake, supra note 3 (noting that courts have universally
held that MCS evidence does not survive Daubert).
131. For discussions of different scientific methodologies with which P's seek
to establish causation, see supra notes 87-128 and accompanying text.
132. For discussion of the different applications of legal standards, see infra
notes 139 and accompanying text.
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courts address the reliability of testimony. 133 The Court acknowl-
edged that different versions of factor sets may have some merit
and may bear on the inquiry, but nevertheless, the Court "made
clear that the district court's gate-keeper role is a flexible one and
that [such factors] are simply useful signposts, not dispositive hur-
dles that a party must overcome in order to have expert testimony
admitted."1 34 The Daubert Court, therefore, refused to establish a
definitive checklist or test.135
The Supreme Court recognized with confidence the ability of
federal judges to undertake the responsibility of determining
whether testimony is admissible. 136  Nevertheless, the Court
stressed, "that while Daubert assigns trial judges the role as gate
keepers, it does not authorize trial judges to act as 'super-experts,'
or to scrutinize experts in such a way as to exclude all but the per-
fect expert testimony."137 In other words, "shaky" but admissible
evidence should be attacked by cross-examination, instruction on
133. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 n.12 (citing as examples: United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1985); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER 702, 702-
42; McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA
L. REV. 879, 911-12 (1982); and Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99
F.R.D. 187, 231 (1983) (statement by Margaret Berger)). Capra stipulates:
After Daubert, the courts have focused on several factors other than those
listed in the Daubert opinion, that are considered relevant to whether an
expert's testimony is unreliable and hence inadmissible. The factors in-
clude: (1) improper extrapolation-drawing an unaccepted conclusion
from an accepted premise, (2) reliance on anecdotal evidence-basing
an opinion solely on personal experience with patients or on a few case
studies, (3) reliance on temporal proximity-basing a conclusion about
causation on the short time span between exposure to a substance and
the subsequent inquiry, (4) dissonance between expert testimony and the
facts of the case, (5) failure to consider other causes, (6) lack of testifying,
and (6) [sic] subjectivity-not being able to explain a methodology in
objective terms. None of these factors is considered dispositive, but each
has been considered as cutting against admissibility.
Capra, supra note 42, at 714. For further discussion of courts' attempts to more
conclusively define Daubert, see supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
134. Heller, 167 F.3d at 152; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 n. 12 (stating
"[T]o the extent that [the additional factors] focus on the reliability of the evi-
dence as ensured by the scientific validity of its underlying principles, all of these
versions may have merit, although we express no opinion regarding any of their
particular details").
135. See id. (stating "we do not presume to set out a definitive check list or
test"). For further discussion of Daubert's vagueness and open-endedness, see supra
notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
136. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (recognizing ability of federal judges to deter-
mine whether expert testimony is admissible).
137. Capra, supra note 42, at 735.
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the burden of proof and presentation of contradictory evidence. 138
Although it provides federal judges with some discretion, Daubert
does not, work a "seachange over federal evidence law[;] . .. the
trial court's role as gate keeper is not intended to serve as a replace-
ment for the adversary system. " 13 9 Stated in a different way, courts
should avoid, when determining admissibility of expert testimony,
evaluating witness credibility and weighing the evidence-"the age-
less role of the jury. '"140
Plaintiffs seeking to establish causation in toxic tort may wish
to bring to the court's attention that the Rules of Evidence were
intended to be applied with a "liberal thrust."141 They may want to
point out that the majority in Daubert did not intend their "guide-
lines" to be applied dispositively.1 42 Plaintiffs may also maintain the
Daubert factors are not worthy of absolute judicial reliance. 143
While concurring in part and dissenting in part with respect to the
majority's opinion in Daubert, Chief Justice Rehnquist with whom
Justice Stevens joined, asserted that the "general observations" of-
fered by the majority were "vague and abstract."144 Rehnquist also
implied that the proliferation of such standards was unfortunate
considering the fact that "general observations" by the Supreme
Court "customarily carry great weight with the lower federal
courts." 1
45
B. Other courts and commentators offer additional pro-plaintiff
arguments
Toxic tort plaintiffs may try to demonstrate a recent tendency
by the higher courts' to somewhat retract the gate-keeping respon-
138. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (stating that "vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contradictory evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof are the traditional means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence").
139. United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that district court, by excluding certain evidence, abused its discretion by
applying too rigidly the reliability test).
140. See Capra, supra note 42, at 737.
141. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (noting that the Federal Rules intended a
"liberal thrust").
142. See id. at 593 (stating that Court did not intend to set out definitive test
or checklist).
143. See id. at 598 (C.J. Rehnquistjoined byJ. Stevens concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that majority's "general observations" are "vague and
abstract").
144. See id.
145. See id.
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sibilities of district court judges. 146 For example, the Third Circuit
in Heller, effectively extinguished any inclination the district court
may have had to rigidly apply the Daubert/Paoli factors as a test for
admissibility in the future.147 Plaintiffs could argue that Heller is a
slight departure from the Third Circuit's prior holding in Paoli
which more narrowly interpreted Rule 702 by providing the district
court with additional grounds for excluding testimony. 1 48  The
Third Circuit in Heller, chose to evaluate the reliability and rele-
146. For discussion of this possible trend, see infra notes 145-52, 162-66 and
accompanying text.
147. See Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc. (Heller 11), 167 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir.
1999) (holding that Daubert factors are simply signposts, not dispositive hurdles
party should have to overcome); but see Kent v. Howell Electric Motors, et al., No.
96-7221, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10940, at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 1999) (excluding
expert causation testimony and granting summary judgment because expert failed
to rule out reasonable alternative theories of causation suggested by defendant).
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania appar-
ently interpreted Heller H to have established a rule prohibiting experts from testi-
fying when the expert is unable to offer explanations for defendant's suggestions
of alternative possible causes. Id. The Kent court noted, "[o] ne minimum reliabil-
ity threshold seems to have emerged: for his testimony to be reliable, an expert
must rule out obvious alternative causes." Kent, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10940, at
*12 (citing Heller II, 167 F.3d at 156).
It appears, at first, that the Eastern District, with its decision in Kent, did not
heed the Third Circuit's implied "warning" against overzealous "gate keeping." See
Heller II, 167 F.3d at 152 (holding that courts should apply factors flexibly). It
seems that the district court applied the "nondispositive" factors dispositively,
found that the testimony did not fit all of Daubert's general observations and Paoli's
factors and consequently excluded it. See Kent, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10940, at
*23-24. This is not, however, how the district court disposed of the plaintiffs wit-
ness. Id. at *12.
The district court in Kent acknowledged Kumho Tire, which held that the
Daubert factors may not be applicable in every case. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 140 (1999). The district court employed this rationale
in its decision in Kent "[a] s the Court in Kumho predicted, some of the Daubert
factors are inapplicable to this methodology .... Similarly, some of the Downing
factors bear little significance." Kent, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10940, at *18. Never-
theless, the district court applied the remainder of the applicable factors to the
expert's testimony in question. See id. If the court's inquiry ended at that junc-
ture, the expert's methodology would have likely been reliable. See id. In the end,
however, the district court excluded the expert's testimony because the expert
failed to rule out alternative causes suggested by the defendant. Id.
The Heller II court interpreted this "threshold" to operate only if the expert
offered no explanation for the alternative causation theories suggested by the de-
fendant. See Heller I, 167 F.3d at 156 (holding that although plaintiff's expert did
not offer detailed explanations to rebut defendant's suggested alternative theories
of causation, he certainly offered more than "no explanation"). Kent is not in con-
flict with Heller II, however, and is, therefore, not an attempt by the district court to
overzealously exercise its "gate[-]keeping" responsibilities. The district court
stated specifically, "[the expert] offered no explanation at all to rebut [defen-
dant's] theories." Kent, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10940, at *18 (emphasis added).
148. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742 n. 8 (listing admissibility criteria in addition to
Daubert's general observations).
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vancy of testimony by viewing it in its entirety, as opposed to break-
ing the evidence up in order to determine whether specific aspects
of the testimony met the Daubert/Paoli factors.149 The Third Circuit
implied that federal judges should step back from their role as "tes-
timony excluders" and look at the proffered testimony as a
whole. 150 The federal standard should call on judges to examine
the testimony as "gate keepers" under the reliability and relevancy
requirements which favor admissibility while maintaining the re-
spective roles of the judge and jury in the adversarial process as the
Federal Rules intended.1 51 The Heller court noted:
We have held that the reliability analysis applies to all
aspects of an expert's testimony: the methodology, the
facts underlying the expert's opinion, the link between
the facts and the conclusion, et alia. However, not only
must each stage of the expert's testimony be reliable, but
each stage must be evaluated practically and flexibly with-
out bright-line exclusionary (or inclusionary) rules. 152
Clearly the Third Circuit implied that district court judges
need to exercise their discretion to an extent in order to prevent
juries from being misled by 'junk science.' 5 3 In reviewing the trial
court's decision for abuse of discretion, the Third Circuit noted,
however, that the district court judge had too strictly applied some
of the Daubert/Paoli factors. 1 54
149. See Heller II, 167 F.3d at 159 (holding that conclusions drawn did not
reliably flow from methodology and facts at issue).
150. See id. at 152 (holding that by listing Daubert factors, Supreme Court did
not intend to obscure fact that district court's gate-keeper role is flexible one).
151. See id. (holding that vigorous cross examination and other safeguards of
adversary system are appropriate means of attacking shaky evidence that is other-
wise admissible). For discussion of adversary safeguards and respective roles of the
judge and jury with respect to attacking expert evidence, see supra note 160-62 and
accompanying text.
152. Id. at 155. (citation omitted) The ideas embodied in Heller II are consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's most recent decision interpreting the requirements
of Daubert and Rule 702. Cf. Kumho Tire Co., v. Carmichael, et al., 526 U.S. 137,
140 (concluding that "relevant reliability inquiry 'should be 'flexible,' that its
'overarching subject [should be] .. .validity and reliability,' and that 'Daubert was
intended neither to be exhaustive nor to apply in every case"").
153. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (discussing need for inquiry into reliability
and relevancy of expert testimony); Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 140 (discussing that
reliability inquiry is necessary); Heller, 167 F.3d 146, 152-52 (discussing Daubert
requirements).
154. See Heller, 167 F.3d at 158, 164-65 (noting that district court erred in
excluding certain aspects of evidence offered by plaintiffs experts but ultimately
holding that district court was correct in excluding their testimony because, over-
all, their conclusions did not reliably flow from methodologies employed).
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The U.S. Supreme Court, since Daubert, has implied that its
"general observations" should not be taken too seriously.1 55 Less
than four years after the Court decided Daubert, it heard General
Electric Co. v. Joiner.156 The majority held that under an abuse of
discretion standard, the district court was correct to exclude plain-
tiffs expert who opined that PCB tests on laboratory mice were rel-
evant to prove that such substances caused cancer in humans. 157
The Court held that there was "simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered." 158 In other words,
the Court determined that the methodologies employed by experts
and the conclusions they generate are not entirely distinct from
one another. 159 Justice Stevens, on the other hand, disagreed in
part with the majority.1 60 In the dissenting portion of his opinion,
he maintained that the majority's decision effectively invited judges
to resolve questions regarding credibility and weight of expert evi-
dence.161 These questions, Stevens adamantly stated, are within the
province of the jury.162 One commentator noted:
Stevens is undoubtedly correct in his assessment of the
mischief that may lurk in the [majority's] observations.
Following Daubert, the two remaining protections re-
straining overzealous federal judges from intruding on the
jury's fact finding responsibility were the methodology-
conclusion distinction and effective appellate review. By
diluting both of these protections, Joiner may provide
cover for judges who simply do not believe the expert's
testimony. As a result, Joiner may further the unfortunate
erosion of the role of the jury.163
This commentator, Jeffery Robert White, an associate general
counsel with the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, also ex-
pressed his hope that the next time the Court offered some "gen-
155. For discussion of the application of the Court's "general observations"
since Daubert, see infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
156. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).
157. See id. at 141-43 (discussing standard of review and holding).
158. Id. at 143.
159. See id. (discussing holding).
160. See id. at 145 (J. Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (refusing to join in part of majority opinion which discusses admissibility stan-
dards under Daubert).
161. See id at 145-46 (discussing flaws in majority's opinion with respect to the
exclusion of plaintiffs experts).
162. See id.
163. Jeffery Robert White, Experts and Judges, 34-SEP TRL 91, *92.
20011
27
Alberts: Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: Which Way Do We Go, Judge
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001
60 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
eral observations," such observations would remind the lower
federal courts to uphold the adversary system and allow the jury to
do its job.16 4
White may have gotten his wish. In 1999, the Court handed
down its decision in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. CarmichaeL165 A careful
reading of Kuhmo may provide toxic tort plaintiffs with all of the
ammunition they need to try to convince district court judges to
relax their application of the Daubert factors and more readily admit
novel scientific testimony.166 The Kumho Court held that the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 702, do not create a "sche-
matism that segregates expertise by type while mapping certain
kinds of questions to certain kinds of experts. Life and the legal
cases that it generates are too complex to warrant too definitive a
match."' 6 7 The Court noted that the "gate-keeping role" of trial
judges is important, but in exercising discretion, trial judges should
consider the specific Daubert factors only when they are "reasonable
measures of the reliability of expert testimony."168 Because of the
unique nature of causation requirements in toxic torts, plaintiffs
may argue that many of the Daubert factors are unreasonable mea-
sures of reliability - especially where experts must testify as to
novel sciences. 69
III. WHICH WAY DO YOU GO, JUDGE?
An assessment of relevant case law leads to the ultimate conclu-
sion that admissibility determinations are left with the trialjudge.17 0
Most appellate courts afford the trial judges' decisions, with respect
164. See id. at *94 (promoting need for adversary system).
165. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 143 (1999) (dis-
cussing application of Daubert to non-scientific evidence).
166. See id. at 146 (discussing need for flexible application of the Daubert
factors).
167. Id. at 146.
168. See id. (emphasis added). It is also important to note that the Court in
Kuhmo maintained that the trial judge has broad latitude to determine whether the
Daubert factors are reasonable measures of reliability. See id.
169. See id. (discussing that Daubert factors should only be used to assess relia-
bility when it is reasonable). Plaintiffs proffering evidence based upon novel sci-
ences should argue that the Daubert factors are unreasonable measures of
reliability because the Daubert factors are not conducive to permitting such evi-
dence even if the evidence is otherwise reliable. For example, many novel sciences
have not had the chance to be peer reviewed or otherwise tested outside of the
litigation context.
170. For discussion of district court judge's role as "gate keeper," see supra
notes 61, 76-77, 79-82, 132, 134, 138, 166 and accompanying text.
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to admissibility or exclusion, much discretion.1 71 This Comment is
not intended to suggest that courts will consider the arguments
favoring admissibility with respect to toxic tort causation evidence
grounded in novel sciences; this Comment is merely intended to
demonstrate that a strict application of the Daubert factors will inevi-
tably render most causation evidence inadmissible. 172
Daubert scholars and many other members of the legal commu-
nity are beginning to recognize that certain admissibility standards
are hostile to plaintiffs seeking to establish causation based upon
novel sciences. 173 The need to keep 'junk science" out of the court-
room, however, hinders judges from taking a liberal view on admis-
sibility and fully considering the causation problems with which
toxic tort plaintiffs are confronted. 174 Thus, the toxic tort plaintiff
is faced with the question, "Which way do we go, Judge?"
While admissibility issues could be resolved by "forging a new
tort doctrine to deal with causal uncertainties," courts have refused
to move in that direction.1 75 Presently, the only appropriate advice
one can provide to toxic tort plaintiffs who seek to offer expert evi-
dence based upon novel science is as follows: "Hire your expert
wisely. Be sure that the court will find your expert credible and her
opinion well founded. At the very least, understand how the expert
formulated her opinion regarding... causation. Find all scientific
literature that supports the methodology by which your expert
171. SeeJoiner, 522 U.S. at 141 (discussing that proper standard of review is
"abuse of discretion standard"); see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 146 (noting that
trial judge has considerable discretion in making admissibility determinations).
172. For discussion of admissibility problems with respect to novel sciences
under Daubert inquiry, see supra notes 87-129 and accompanying text. For discus-
sion concerning arguments against dispositive application of Daubert factors, see
supra notes 139-167 and accompanying text.
173. See Gussak lecture, supra note 62 (discussing growing awareness in legal
community with respect to admissibility of novel sciences as causation evidence);
see also Miller & Rein, supra note 7. Miller & Rein note that:
The pro-plaintiff group, Trial lawyers for Public Justice, recently ex-
pressed to the Supreme court that "a number of trial judges . . .have
assumed the roles of jurors and 'amateur scientists' in rejecting expert
testimony with which they disagree, effectively barring the victims of mass
torts and toxic exposures from the courthouse." This is perhaps one of
the clearest indications of the growing tendency in trial courts to under-
take a rigorous review of proposed causality testimony breaking new, non-
peer-reviewed, and generally-disputed ground.
Id. at 572-73. But see Becker v. National Health Products, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 100, 104
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (admitting expert testimony bqsed upon relatively novel sciences).
174. For discussion of "junk science," see supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
175. See Miller & Rein, supra note 7 at n.94 (discussing courts' unwillingness
to adopt a new doctrine).
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reached her conclusion."176 Another possible remedy to plaintiffs
causation problem, as previously discussed, requires plaintiff to ar-
gue that the Federal Rules and Daubert intend a less-restrictive and
flexible application of the admission criteria. 177 Counsel should
promote the role of the jury in the adversary system and urge the
court to understand the difficulties associated with demonstrating
the reliability and usefulness of novel sciences. 178
One more possibility exists, however, that may allow courts to
distinguish between 'Junk science" and novel, but admissible, sci-
ence and at the same time allow plaintiffs to have an opportunity to
establish causation. Kuhmo Tire and Federal Rule of Evidence 706
provide guidance in this regard. 179 When deciding preliminary
questions of admissibility, courts may employ their own experts.'80
Court-appointed experts may be useful to help judges, who ordina-
rily have little or no scientific background, to distinguish between
'Junk science" and science that is not, under Daubert, "grounded in
science," "peer reviewed" or "generally accepted" because it is
novel. 181 The court-appointed expert, as a neutral, third party, may
be "needed to investigate reliability."'182
Toxic tort cases provide a perfect opportunity for district court
judges to employ experts for this use. 183 Nearly a century ago,
Judge Learned Hand proposed a similar resolution to the admissi-
176. James E. Morgan, ed., 24 LmG. NEws No.3, 12 (Mar. 1999) (citing James
R. Ronca).
177. For discussion of flexible, more "plaintiff-friendly" interpretation of
Daubert, see supra notes 139-67 and accompanying text.
178. For discussion of arguments favoring the adversary system and the role
of the jury over the judge's exclusionary power with respect to expert evidence, see
supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. For discussion of difficulties associated
with expert causation evidence grounded in novel sciences, see supra notes 87-129
and accompanying text.
179. See Kumho Tire, 522 U.S. at 141 (discussing ability of trial judges to en-
gage in special briefings or proceedings in order to investigate reliability of prof-
fered evidence); see also FED. R. Evm. 706 (granting judges authority to appoint
their own expert witnesses).
180. For discussion of court-appointed experts, see supra note 177 and accom-
panying text, and see infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
181. SeeJudith A. Hasko, Note: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Flex-
ible Judicial Screening of Scientific Evidence Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 1995 Wis.
L. REv. 479, 501-04 (discussing judges' need to familiarize themselves with scien-
tific principles in order to decide preliminary questions on admissibility of
experts).
182. See Kuhmo Tire, 522 U.S. at 141 (noting that courts may use experts or
other proceedings in order to investigate reliability of evidence).
183. See Hasko, supra note 181, at 501-04 (discussing that court-appointed ex-
perts would be helpful to judges making admissibility determinations).
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bility problem.'8 4 He concluded that conflicting expert testimony
should be presented to a "board of experts or a single expert, not
called by either side" who would relate a final statement to the
jury.18 5 In order to preserve the jury's fact-finding role, Judge
Hand maintained that the testimony proffered by the non-biased
panel or single expert should have evidentiary, rather than conclu-
sive, status.186 It is obvious that the admissibility determinations in-
evitably remain with the trial judge acting as the "gate keeper."18 7
Whether the trial judge will consider arguments that favor admissi-
bility and whether the judge will employ his own experts in order to
help make reliability determinations is solely within the judge's dis-
cretion.188 Maybe the question is not, "Which way do we go, Judge,"
but rather, "Which way do you go, Judge."
Laurie Alberts
184. See Miller & Rein, supra note 7, at 576 (quoting Learned Hand, Historical
and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REv. 40, 56
(1901)).
185. See id. (discussing Learned Hand's suggestion for addressing admissibil-
ity issues).
186. See id. (citing Hand, supra note 184, at 56-57).
187. For discussion of judge's role as "gate keeper," see supra note 63.
188. For discussion of discretion with respect to preliminary questions of ad-
missibility afforded to district court judges, see supra notes 61, 76-77, 79-82, 132,
134-38, 166, 185 and accompanying text.
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